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Abstract
This article presents a novel account of a key concept in John Dewey’s
reconstructionist theory specifically related to the nucleus underlying his
idea of democracy: intersubjective communication, what Dewey called
the “democratic criterion.” Many theorists relate democracy to a form of
rule. Consequently, discussions of democracy tend to be limited to functionalist theories. Dewey’s idea of democracy establishes an important
distinction from conventional theories by developing its radical, critical,
evolutionary, and intersubjective potential. I argue that Dewey anticipated
Jürgen Habermas’s Paradigm of Communication in his reconstructionist
social theory with potential to de-reify institutions and to empower human
beings democratically.

Of unparalleled importance in John Dewey’s democratic philosophy is his focus on
the process of change, or the “continuous reconstruction of experience.”1 But how
is change to take place and under what circumstances does it best occur? What are
the ramifications of Dewey’s theory of change and reconstruction on representative government and political rule? Is change expected to occur pragmatically as a
planned process, or is change understood as inchoate phenomena occurring sporadically in Dewey’s philosophy? Who determines change and the degree to which
it shall take place? Why does Dewey prioritize democratic communication over
other forms of communication?
Dewey clearly connects his philosophy of change and reconstruction to governance, but he develops an ontological basis for change that subsumes more than
mere political rule. For Dewey, change and reconstruction are such fundamental parts
of human experience that he represents them as part of a biological and evolutionary process of human adaptation to social and natural environments. Change and
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reconstruction encompass all forms of life, not just politics, and because he perceives
change in this way, he links the process of change with a deeply moral attribute of
human existence, namely, democracy and communication. Since we all experience
change naturally, Dewey develops a democratic moral theory of how social change
should take place. Therefore, Dewey ruptures traditional political theories that view
democracy purely as a form of governance, “as a system of command and obedience,”
as Markell asserts, which “risk[s] sacrificing the spirit of insubordination that animates . . . change, interruption, openness, and novelty.”2 Dewey’s philosophy elevates
democratic change and social reconstruction, making them the background against
which politics (and other spheres of social existence) are measured. In other words,
the substance of social practices, economic activities, and political rule are assessed by
the extent to which they adhere to the moral expectations of democratic experience.
The other key component in Dewey’s philosophy of change and reconstruction is communication, also an experience that must adhere to democratic principles in reaching consensus in a social order. Furthermore, the moral value of
democratic communication is that it changes the participants involved in interaction. Again, Dewey conceives of this democratic process as an evolutionary means
of social adaptation and transformation. For example, in Democracy and Education he asserts that the experience of communication “requires” the participants
“to formulate” perspectives that are “not their own,” to understand something “as
another would see it.” This is a process, he asserts, wherein participants “assimilate,
imaginatively, something of another’s experience.” Moreover, it is virtuous because
it contributes to actualizing “what one is capable of becoming through association
with others in all the offices of life.”3 Growth requires penetrating the confines of
custom and habit. The fundamental importance of communication and change
or reconstruction are summarized by Dewey in terms of his “democratic ideal:”
The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common
interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests
as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups . . . but change in social habit—its continuous
readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied
intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society.4 (Emphasis added)

Dewey’s focus on change, democracy, and communication anticipates Jürgen
Habermas’s communication paradigm. In what follows, I analyze and compare
Dewey’s and Habermas’s analysis of the moral and democratic (qua Dewey) dimensions of communication, and the intersubjective normative basis (qua Habermas)
that both theorists develop. Dewey offers a distinctive philosophy of democratic
communication that appears to have informed Habermas and contributed to the
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latter’s construction of an equally elaborate moral basis for social order. I attempt
to explicate Dewey’s theory of democratic communication and how it anticipates
the moral basis of Habermas’s contemporary communicative action theory, which
is grounded in intersubjectivity. Both Dewey and Habermas emphasize the following elements in their underlying theories, which are listed in Figure 1. Change or
reconstruction serves as a necessary expectation of any critical theory intended to
advance or emancipate individuals from systems of power. Democratic experience
contributes to growth or actualization through communication, the latter of which
is a fundamentally natural means of experiencing the other elements.
Indeed, the degree of change permitted during any specified time, epoch, or
place, whether social, political, economic or religious, remains circumscribed by
existing cultural parameters and the extent to which these parameters are penetrable. Cultural limitations, for example, delimit the framework for acceptable debate
and discourse, which include defining the participants who can enter into communication, the extent to which cultural and mystical traditions may be critiqued,
and the presence or absence of expert, authoritative, or privileged “validity claims.”
Additional considerations include the extent to which institutional structures either
facilitate or obstruct participation, and the degree to which existing cultural knowledge is capable of distinguishing between what Habermas refers to as “the objective,
social, and subjective worlds,” and the extent to which rationalities are differentiated
as “propositional truth, normative rightness, [and] subjective truthfulness,” according to Habermas. In addition, “cultural tradition must permit a reflective relation
to itself” to allow for critique, and “action-oriented . . . success . . . freed from the
imperatives of an understanding that is to be communicatively renewed.”5
Likewise, Dewey asserts that readjustments to our understanding depend upon
the extent to which education can “modify mental and moral attitudes” that have
become static. What is necessary, according to Dewey, is “an educational reformation” that stimulates “thoroughgoing change in social life.”6 The process of education,
which includes recurring intersubjective critiques of the status quo in order to actualize desired change, is as instinctive, Dewey believed, as one’s adaptation to an altering
natural environment. Habituation is also a natural human inclination. We settle into
new surroundings through a process of readjustment and adaptation, and what was
once new becomes familiar and commonplace. “This enduring adjustment,” according to Dewey, “supplies the background upon which are made specific adjustments,
as occasion arises.”7 Likewise, in criticizing Talcott Parson’s social theory, Habermas
addresses the fundamental importance of this background knowledge in developing his own communication theory. According to Habermas, it is “the interpretive
accomplishments of participants in interaction, which make consensus possible [and]
central to the concept of social order.” It is through the “language-dependent processes of reaching understanding, he argues, [that] take place against the background
of an intersubjectively shared tradition, especially of values accepted in common.”8
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Long before Habermas published his magnum opus on communicative
action, Dewey concluded that humanity had yet to understand the significance of,
and the potential benefits that could be generated by, socializing and systematizing
democratic communication. More recent scholarship focusing on Dewey’s communication theory, often referred to as the “neopragmatic interpretation of Dewey
. . .” or “the pragmatic renaissance,” views Dewey “as an advocate of education as
communication,” according to Englund. From this perspective, one that I share,
“education is just one aspect of a democratic form of social life that is communicative.”9 Education, like democracy, is overwhelmingly part of complex human
experiences and therefore cannot be reduced solely to formal schooling, although
it is the latter that rightfully takes center stage in Dewey’s philosophical agenda.
Too often, Dewey asserted, “Men . . . want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs
fixed by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility
of directing their activity by thought.” Paraphrasing John Stuart Mill, Dewey concluded that traditional schooling, for example, was “better adapted . . . to mak[ing]
disciples than inquirers.”10 Dewey refers to “the ideal of a continuous reconstruction
. . . of experience,” which derives its “meaning or social content” by augmenting
“the capacity of individuals to act as directive guardians of this reorganization,”
otherwise known as his “democratic criterion.”11 Acknowledging the “risks” that
are often present during inquiry, only by increasing the number of individuals
who take part in communicatively reconstructing society, “a widening of the area
of vision through a growth of social sympathies,” Dewey argued, “does thinking
develop to include what lies beyond our direct interests: a fact of great significance
for education.”12 Adhering to custom is a rational human response, according to
Dewey, for it provides a settled and fixed foundation upon which to subsist, but
he viewed parochialism and conventionality as “rigid” and too mechanical, thus
inhibiting mankind’s potential for progressive change. “By its very nature, a state
is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for,”13 according to
Dewey, but we too often reify social institutions by our “passive acquiescence . . .
and a minimum of active control.”14 Habermas refers to this as a process of system
integration that has been decoupled from the lifeworld.15
Inquiry and critique of the status quo, the fundamentals of scientific investigations, are bold endeavors that Dewey sought to socialize in order to “dissolve” outdated, routinized, or prohibitive “custom[s].” Dewey’s “democratic ideal” requires
“the recognition of mutual interests,” which can only take place through intersubjective communication, and it must always be amenable to change or “continuous
readjustment.”16 In Democracy and Education, for example, Dewey recognizes the
value, in fact the necessity, of intersubjective (democratic) discourse when he claims
that “competing philosophies” must come together for the practical purpose of
reaching agreement. Diverse social, economic, and political groups often view their
environments differently and sometimes in conflicting ways, and it is necessary,
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he argues, to make possible the dialectical and democratic deliberations that can
respond to emerging conflicts, broaden cultural horizons, and renew thinking.17
Recognizing the state as a fallible human construction, Dewey concluded that,
“Almost as soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be re-made.”18 History provides
proof of this, according to Dewey, in that as much as we try to achieve a utopia,
it is impossible to construct a perfect state once and for all. There will always be
unforeseen problems, even in a state that has been studiously predetermined by
its founders. The ideal preconceived polity will always fall short of its conception,
which is why “the formation of states must be” viewed as “an experimental process”
and dependent upon continuous reconstruction through shared communication.
Put differently, “The State must always be rediscovered,” he declared.19
Dewey disliked institutional inertness, and, like Habermas, he believed the
state should not determine social relationships, but that social relationships should
be organized in ways that facilitate intersubjective communication and potentials
for progressive change. “The belief in political fixity,” he declared, “of the sanctity of
some form of state consecrated by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradition, is one of the stumbling blocks in the way of orderly and directed change,” and
“it is an invitation to revolt and revolution.”20 Likewise, Habermas viewed systems
as “forming one system or discourse, which steer[s] communications . . . described
in a language that objectivistically disregards actors’ self-understanding.”21 The
State forms an important aspect of our environment, political and otherwise, and
Dewey sought means to ensure the constant social adaptation to changing conditions and to enable citizens to hold systems accountable to a public will formed by
intersubjective communication. States are merely reconstructions of what used to be
considered new or novel. The seeds of change may be dormant for a time, but they
eventually germinate into a new form. Political revolutions inform change, but the
institutions that emerge after the dust has settled should be prevented from concretizing social relationships that simply regenerate a new “objective reason manifested
in the [new] state.”22 Building upon Immanuel Kant’s Pedagogics, “creative effort” is
facilitated when “men consciously strive . . . to educate their successors not for the
existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a future better humanity.” Otherwise, systems of education become mere conduits used to functionally reinforce
the existing state of affairs, similar to the goals of “social efficiency.”23
Dewey’s concern about the problem of freezing social institutions after the
establishment of a state is shared by Sheldon Wolin. For example, Wolin asks what
might be considered a Deweyan question: “If democracy is rooted in revolution, what
of democracy is suppressed by a constitution?” In other words, according to Wolin,
“When a democratic revolution leads to a constitution, does that mark the fulfillment of democracy, or the beginning of its attenuation?”24 Of course, the answer to
this question depends on the constitution and the extent to which it facilitates democratic participation and communication. Dewey was critical of contemporary politics
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because, as he put it, “the Public seems to be lost;” that “popular imagination can conceive of no other way by which . . . governmental affairs [may be] carried on than by
the façade of representative government,” which often serves as a veneer to perpetuate
the interests of a few.25 “A society which makes provision for participation in its good
of all its members on equal terms,” according to Dewey, “and which secures flexible
readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated
life is in so far democratic.”26 Bynum appears to agree, contending that “Dewey’s antiessentialist assertion that society exists ‘in transmission, in communication,’ develops
from an account of ‘life’ that opens Democracy and Education and forms the philosophical basis for Dewey’s conception of society and education.”27 The lingering problem, which Dewey acknowledges, is that the American founding was not an attempt
at democracy. Rather, the founding resulted in a constitution that separated, through
a number of checks and balances, democratic accountability while contributing to a
system, in Habermasian terms, which mostly took on a life of its own distinct from
popular control. The problem of reifying political and social institutions can best be
understood through Dewey’s view of the American and French Revolutions.

Looking Back to the American and French Revolutions:
Understanding Dewey’s Criticisms of the Enlightenment
During the American and French Revolutions emotional claims and diatribes were
devoted to the subject of regime change and the transformation of older systems or
systems that had gone astray. The more radical perspective was expounded by individuals like Thomas Paine, who believed that the revolutions symbolized legitimate
breaks from the dead weight of tradition once reflective conditions cultivated the
possibility to reconstruct inherited practices. New powerful critiques of Britain’s and
France’s monarchical regimes, founded on “Superstition” and “Power,” according
to Paine, justified their overthrow and the substitution of new institutions based
on enlightened reason to promote the common good. Believing the British government to be rotten to the core, Paine argued for supplanting it root and branch.
“All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny,” Paine demurred.28 The more
conservative Edmond Burke, on the other hand, who believed that many of Britain’s and France’s cultural traditions were worth saving, believed that generational
change must be gradual, pragmatic, respectful of existing institutions, and lawful.
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke quotes from Euripides’s Telephus, “Spartam nactus es; hanc exorna” (Your lot is cast in Sparta, be a credit to
it). Burke’s point was that a citizen must “make the most of the existing materials
of his country” by balancing his “disposition to preserve” that which is beneficial
with “an ability to improve” upon existing defects.29
Burke and Paine helped define the parameters of debate and possibilities for
change during the late eighteenth century, with Burke viewing the body politic as a
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naturally evolving organism that is historically conditioned and relatively stable, and
Paine shifting the emphasis from a pragmatic position to radically questioning the
very premises upon which British representative government stood regardless of its
duration. Both men saw value in change, but Burke admired tradition and prudence
as much as Paine sought extrication from history by seeking revolutionary change
and rebirth.30 While Burke may have been too deferential to traditional authority and
Paine too bombastic in developing a predetermined state of affairs, neither focused
on the value of political arrangements that could enable an intersubjective and normatively based process of frequent renewal. Dewey recognized this shortcoming.
Dewey was critical of many Enlightenment thinkers beyond Paine and Burke,
including Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Adam Smith, all of whom were overly committed to establishing predetermined blueprints for ideal political arrangements. Dewey
criticized Locke’s foundationalism, for example, in the latter’s development of “a rigid
doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization,”
as well as Locke’s privileging “natural law” (metaphysically devised) over “positive
law” (socially devised).31 In other words, Dewey criticized Locke and others because
their theories hinged on ethereal and abstract principles, such as natural law, which
had no social or worldly basis. In addition, Dewey found fault in their developing
hyper-individualistic theories that not only privileged economic interests, but also
resulted in what Habermas referred to later as “an anonymous system independent
of the intentions of unconsciously sociated individuals, a system that followed its
own logic and subjected society as a whole to the economically decoded imperatives
of its self-stabilization.” Of utmost importance is the fact that, as a “mechanism of
social integration,” the “political economy” emerged as “a non-normative one.”32
Habermas is reemphasizing the same scathing criticism that Dewey made half
a century earlier with regard to the eclipse of the public. “Till the Great Society,” by
which Dewey meant individualistic, impersonal, economic society, “is converted into
a Great Community” that gives priority to collective action, “the Public will remain
in eclipse,” he demurred. Antonio and Kellner similarly explain one of Habermas’s
criticisms of the western Enlightenment project as “seeking an Archimedean point”
that is historically and culturally indefatigable, or in Habermas’s own words, a theory that “start[s] with ‘concrete ideals immanent in traditional forms of life.’” On
the contrary, Habermas concludes, “the theory of communicative action . . . must
proceed ‘reconstructively’” and democratically as a function of “social critique.”33
Furthermore, Dewey voiced concern over the fact that “mass production”
was not merely “confined to the factory,” but that it had invaded the intimate and
social spaces that should otherwise exist as venues for collective action. The “Public”
was “lost,” he complained, and the only way to restore the Public was to democratize communication. It “alone,” he asserted, “can . . . create a great community.”34
Similarly, in Democracy and Education Dewey writes about the significance of
intersubjective communication:
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Impulses of communication and habits of intercourse have to be adapted
to maintaining successful connections with others; a large fund of social
knowledge accrues. As a part of this intercommunication one learns much
from others. They tell of their experiences and of the experiences which,
in turn, have been told them. In so far as one is interested or concerned in
these communications, their matter becomes a part of one’s own experience. Active connections with others are such an intimate and vital part of
our own concerns that it is impossible to draw sharp lines, such as would
enable us to say, “Here my experience ends; there yours begins.” In so far as
we are partners in common undertakings, the things which others communicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in the enterprise
blend at once into the experience resulting from our own special doings.35

According to Sheldon Wolin, Dewey disparaged the Enlightenment philosophers whose economic theories undermined their simultaneous support for
the liberalization of politics. In other words, their support for a free market cultivated “a business culture that thwarted the democratic potential of” republican
institutions. They fused the act of seeking self-interest in the economic realm with
the political and civic realm. This “reduction of politics to interest,” according to
Wolin, “has cast a powerful shadow on modern politics,”36 and Dewey was cognizant of this fact during his day. Government was conceived as an arbiter of conflicting individual interests rather than as a political means of facilitating democratic
communication. Of course, the American Revolution was not intended to secure
a democratic government, which is why Dewey finds fault with it. “Mobocracy”
was conflated with democracy, and the founders structured the new constitution
to delimit democratic possibilities. Political liberty was tempered while freedom
in the economic realm was left virtually unfettered.
In 1971, John Rawls similarly reflected upon the rationalities that distinguished a liberal market with liberal democracy by asserting, “The theory of competitive markets [is] not moved by the desire to act justly” and to realize “just . . .
arrangements.” Rather, these “normally require . . . the use of sanctions” in order to
“stabilize” conflict resulting from “persons who oppose one another as indifferent
if not hostile powers.” The atomistic and self-interested nature of “private society,”
including the competitive market that is intended to channel and give life to these
principles, reminds us that “private society is not held together by a public conviction that its basic arrangements are just and good in themselves, but by the calculations of everyone . . . pursu[ing] their personal ends.”37 The traditional emphasis
on negative liberty and individualism has resulted in modern political institutions
that focus primarily on managing the indifferent and competing interests of private individuals and groups. And because political institutions have been infected
by powerful groups lobbying for private interests, in the same way that increased
capital can offer advantages in the economic sphere, the public realm has been
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eclipsed by a market mentality. In this sense, political institutions become mere
mechanisms for pursuing private benefits, and those persons or corporate bodies
that possess the greatest capital too often enjoy not just market share, but political
influence and political benefits.38 Communication has been removed from the great
mass of citizens, which Dewey describes as the loss of the Public. The “machinelike . . . relationships” that have emerged from a market ethos and spilled over into
the social and political spheres have resulted in the objectification of individuals as
means to achieve self-interested and competitive ends, according to Dewey. These
relationships, what Habermas subsequently refers to as instrumentally oriented,
are not “social” ones, but rather embody attempts to control. “Genuine social life,”
according to Dewey, “is . . . identical with communication,” and when communication is reserved for select members of a community or group, it is neither “social,” in
Dewey’s terms, nor “educative.” Agreement “demands communication, and communication must be democratic for agreement to achieve legitimacy.”39
Interest group politics results in too many policies that fail to meet Dewey’s
democratic expectations; namely, the notion that public policies should be the result of
democratic processes that privilege equal and comprehensive communication so that the
normative agreements generated by this process gain the broadest possible legitimacy
among those who must live under their results. In Habermasian terms, “A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis” in that “it cannot be imposed by” any
of the parties “whether instrumentally through intervention in the situation directly or
strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents.” Furthermore, “agreement
can . . . be objectively obtained by force, but what comes to pass manifestly through
outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively as agreement.”40
Rather than extensive political oversight of the economy, the market has subverted
representative government’s potential normative legitimacy. However, unlike Dewey,
who viewed democracy as an existential activity, Rawls’s liberalism prioritizes “the role
of administration,” according to Wolin, over participatory democracy. Conceptualizing the state as an arbiter of competing interests not only results in the encapsulation
of politics within a market ideology, but it also reduces the citizen and civic virtue to
instrumental—and goal-oriented—rationalities. Wolin concludes, for example, that
“The demos has been hammered into resignation, into fearful acceptance of the economy as the basic reality of its existence, so huge, so sensitive, so ramifying in its consequences that no group, party, or political actors dare alter its fundamental structure.”41
Hannah Arendt likewise concluded that the constitution’s structure not only
diminished possibilities for democratic governance, but it also circumvented this
ideal in favor of a labyrinth-esque framework that largely protected the power of
external economic and aristocratic interests.42 This is why most democratic gains
that have been achieved by women, the disabled, African Americans, Hispanics,
and others have largely occurred through the use of extra-constitutional or unconventional political means. Without the communicative democracy Dewey strove
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to justify, individuals “are given up to the service of ends external to themselves.”43
They are treated as objects that “lose . . . identity as . . . living thing[s].”44 They are
acted upon rather than acting together for agreed upon ends. The key for achieving
progress, Dewey believed, lies in social “intercourse and communication of experience.” In Democracy and Education, for example, he concludes that
A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so
far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives
individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the
habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.45

Likewise, Habermas asserts that, “To the extent that the hypothetical discussion of normative validity claims is institutionalized, the critical potential of
speech can be brought to bear on existing institutions.” However, instrumentally
oriented action manifested in the economic sphere has permeated the public sphere
to such an extent that it has narrowed opportunities to institutionalize civic spaces
that could otherwise democratically empower intersubjectively determined agreements. “With the legal institutionalization of the monetary medium,” according to
Habermas, “success-oriented action steered by egocentric calculations of utility,”
action typical within market systems, “loses its connection to action oriented by
mutual understanding.”46 Furthermore, according to Habermas,
This strategic action, which is disengaged from the mechanism of reaching understanding and calls for an objectivating attitude even in regard to
interpersonal relations, is promoted to the model for methodically dealing
with a scientifically objectivated nature. In the instrumental sphere, purposive activity gets free of normative restrictions to the extent that it becomes
linked to flows of information from the scientific system.47

In addition to the instrumentally oriented action prevalent in the economic sphere,
the social sphere, according to Habermas, has undergone what Weber referred to earlier as “total administration.” Social relationships have become ever more regulated
by bureaucratic systems and institutionalized legal processes that are void of democratic communication. In other words, these relationships, whether or not identified
by recipients receiving public assistance, are “embedded in the context of a life history and of a concrete form of life” that often gets reduced “to a violent abstraction,
not merely because it has to be subsumed under the law, but so that it can be dealt
with administratively.”48 The administrative and legal processes take priority over
understanding the multifarious complexities of each client, and the latter become
objectified in the same way that an inanimate object is acted upon as described by
Dewey in Democracy and Education.49 (1944, 1–5). Similarly, Habermas’s criticism
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of the welfare state is that its administrative and legal functions take on the same
kind of instrumental, goal-oriented action embodied in the economic sphere, but for
different purposes: “‘The process of providing social services takes on a reality of its
own, nurtured above all by the professional competence of public officials, the framework of administrative action, biographical and current “findings”, the readiness
and ability to cooperate of the person seeking the service or being subjected to it.’”50
Dewey criticized this social phenomenon, witnessing its growth following
the Gilded Age and during the early twentieth century. In the midst of the Great
Depression, for example, Dewey wrote in The Social Frontier and criticized the implementation of “compulsory patriotic rites,” required Bible reading in schools, and
teaching a doctrinaire knowledge of the constitution. “Three [American] states” he
disparaged made it “a crime” to teach “evolution,” and several more required “loyalty oaths” among “students as a condition of graduation.” He was appalled by the
fact that teachers unions and tenure were under attack, all of which represented an
atmosphere that he described as “militant” and formulaic.51 These were reactionary
attempts to impose doctrinaire and self-interested curricula onto the public schools
in order to reproduce the status quo and allegiance to an imposing dominant culture.
In Democracy and Education, Dewey clarified this by asserting that an individual’s
“seeming attention, his docility, his memorizings and reproductions . . . will partake of intellectual servility.” Moreover, “such a condition of intellectual subjection
is needed for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not expected to
have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority.”
What Dewey was defining in the early twentieth century was antisocial, and
therefore, anti-communicative forms of existence and control. Such conditions are
“not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic,” he concluded.52 The permeation of the market’s influence in areas that were once considered to be public
responsibilities, including schooling, has been so extensive as to relegate civil society to a pliable condition that allows it to be molded to serve the former’s demands
and interests. Contributing to the eclipse of the public and civic realm is the fact
that the language of economics, which has been so prevalent in our contemporary
national discourse, appears neutral in the same way that positivism positioned the
social sciences during the twentieth century. In other words, the laws of supply and
demand, inflation and interest rates, changes in employment and unemployment
are often invoked as natural phenomena (i.e., laws) and, therefore, void of ideology. Of course, this is inaccurate, but the contemporary ideologies of neoliberalism
and libertarianism tend to be portrayed as naturally apolitical and amoral market
mechanisms that are simply the result of uninhibited interest-seeking individuals.
These ideologies are portrayed as innocuous and free from racist, classist, and sexist intentions or effects because their outcomes are depicted as merely the natural
outgrowth of an invisible hand, which represents nothing more than the sum of
society’s properly functioning organic parts. According to Habermas,
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To the degree that the economic system subjects the life-forms of private
households and the life conduct of consumers and employees to its imperatives, consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance,
and competition gain the force to shape behavior. The communicative
practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian lifestyle; this . . . induced shift to purposive-rational action orientations calls
forth the reaction of a hedonism freed from the pressures of rationality.
As the private sphere is undermined and eroded by the economic system,
so too is the public sphere by the administrative system. The bureaucratic
disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion- and
will-formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty and makes
it easier to uncouple political decision-making from concrete, identityforming contexts of life. Insofar as such tendencies establish themselves, we
get Weber’s (stylized) picture of a legal domination that redefines practical
questions as technical ones and dismisses demands for substantive justice
with a legalistic reference to legitimation through procedure.53

Preceding Habermas, Dewey once concluded that “the state,” the political sphere
that embodies the entire realm of public activity, “was a sum of [all its] units,”54 and
Honohan more recently declared “civil society” a larger public unit that comprises
all of its parts including “associations” that “are hierarchical, non-deliberative and
[that] operate out of the public eye.”55 Dewey (and Habermas after him) developed
theories that strive for genuine democratic governance. A genuine democracy results
in policies that are normatively and legitimately authoritative because, as opposed
to the decisions produced by authoritarian regimes, the decisions and actions of its
subunits, such as the market, are held accountable to a higher archetype.
Today, the economy continues to expand its reach into new areas of life—
privatization of military defense, prison services, and public education, to name
just a few—and this is inverting what should be the predominant authority exercised by a genuine democratic government over its subunits. A government whose
policies embody the confluence of democratically developed norms of consensus
has, on the other hand, very different implications than a government whose policies are implemented as a result of oblique or unscrupulous schemes. Political and
public decision making should not “be organized like corporate bodies,” according
to Habermas,56 but Dewey goes farther by arguing that democratic decision making should filter into other subunits including, but not limited to, the economy.
Democracy is prioritized by Dewey in its relation to the market. In fact, Harbermas
asserts that Dewey, more than any other philosopher, wrote about “‘the essential
need’ to advance ‘the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion.’” It was Dewey’s neopragmatism, and his emphasis on communication, that
resulted in Habermas drawing the following conclusion about his own discourse
theory: “the democratic procedure is institutionalized in discourses and bargaining
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processes by employing forms of communication that promise that all outcomes
reached in conformity with the procedure are reasonable.” Deliberative democracy
“is especially meant to be educative, by providing the “‘methods and conditions’
of political will-formation that Dewey . . . considered ‘the problem of the public.’”57
In response to the overwhelming influence of the market and industrialization
during his day, Dewey offered a newly developed reconstructionist approach that
shifted the focus to fostering a pervasively democratic system of communication
that could continually renew normatively constructed agreements among citizens
who were themselves subjected to these agreements. Too many associations in society, Dewey argued, “lack . . . [a] reciprocity of interest,” such as is the case when “a
gang or clique brings its antisocial spirit into relief,” a spirit that embodies “interests
‘of its own’” and “which shut it out from full interaction with other groups, so that
its prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has got, instead of reorganization
and progress through wider relationships.”58 According to Dewey, his “Democratic
Ideal” required that we acknowledge our interdependence, a “recognition of mutual
interests as a factor in social control,” and the desire for “continuous readjustment”
by confronting change with continuous “intercourse.”59 Democracy served as the
archetype in Dewey’s sociopolitical theory and his educational philosophy. Hierarchically speaking, democracy, which requires reflective and ongoing communication,
is given priority over all other subunits. “A democracy,” Dewey famously asserted
. . . is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated
living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the
number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to
refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others
to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down
of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from
perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more
varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an
individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation
in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed
as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group
which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests.60

Learning is, therefore, not simply the act of inculcating in children a society’s traditional values, norms, and customs, as important as this is. It is an attempt to
cultivate unknown potentialities in each individual, which cannot be fully known
unless the individual is freed from the stultifying institutions that privilege individualistic ontologies. Individuals must be given opportunities to engage in and
reconstruct their environment interdependently with fellow social beings, beings
who vary in multiple respects and therefore contribute multiple perspectives from
which each can engage with, reflect upon, and act collectively to solve problems.
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Only by experiencing the widest possible range of a person’s diverse social environment through communication with others can he or she break the parameters
of a limited parochial knowledge and evolve into a higher plane of existence and
potential, what Dewey refers to as growth. Aaron Schutz summarizes this goal nicely
when he paraphrases from Dewey’s Democracy and Education that, “democratic
communities create a tremendous web of conscious interdependence in which
there are ‘numerous and varied . . . points of shared’ interest that are interpreted
and acted upon differently by different participants. In this way, ‘the intellectual
variations of the individual in observation, imagination, judgment, and invention
. . . can become ‘the agencies of social progress.’”61

Dewey’s Sociopolitical Philosophy: A Democratic Society
Will Shape Possibilities for Democratic Schools
Despite relevant concerns over the pragmatic problems that would likely emerge
in expanding access to deliberations in a multicultural society, as highlighted by
Heather Voke, democratic schooling is an essential ingredient in Dewey’s philosophy conceived to overcome these difficulties. The rules of speech and communication vary among cultures, but this is justification for supporting a communicative
theory rather than an argument opposing it, as with Voke.62 Everyone should have
their perspectives challenged or critiqued, which is the essence of Dewey’s democratic and intersubjective theory. How else can we diffuse conflict and implement
public policies that have been considered from multiple perspectives? Differences
in perspectives must be brought together, according to Dewey, in order to broaden
understanding and intellectual horizons in a diverse society.
Furthermore, Bynum successfully corrects an oversimplified reading of Dewey
by Cornell West. According to Bynum, West criticizes Dewey’s idealism, arguing
that the latter’s deliberative democracy is impracticable due to deeply institutionalized forms of oppression in the United States. Despite West’s reasonable concern,
Bynum responds to this criticism by clarifying Dewey’s philosophy: “It is far from
clear that the future way of life Dewey envisions would” be so limited, “considering his belief that we must constantly modify social life by chopping away the ‘dead
wood’ of newly useless traditions as we reshape conjoint social projects in response to
constant, critical reevaluations of our present experiences’ significance.”63 In response
to West, Bynum clarifies Dewey’s definition of “the social,” which is elaborated in
chapter seven of Democracy and Education: It is “not simply anything that goes on
within a social group, but rather as a particular kind of nonoppressive, mutually
interested relatedness that enables growth in the range and quality of human experience.” Accordingly, “Dewey prepares a standard for judging societies,” according to
Bynum, which adequately addresses West’s criticism, in my opinion.64 Rømer refers
to Dewey’s idea of growth as “a kind of endless doubling of intelligence,” which “can
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only take place in an open and democratic society.” Contrarily, “closed groups . . .
cannot be genuine social groups and, therefore, are unable to offer education in its
proper sense (they can only offer instruction),” as Rømer explains.65
It is not surprising, for example, that Dewey chose schooling and education as
parts of his ontological theory, which give priority to the democratic and interdependent elements of human nature and recognize the necessity of bridging multicultural
communities through the education of youth. Where better, we might ask, in a society
absorbed by institutions that otherwise promote instrumental-, strategic-, and utilitarian-oriented rationalities to develop future citizens than in schools that could, if freed
from these rationalities, inculcate democratic and communicative capabilities in future
citizens? Democratic schooling, Dewey hoped, would focus on developing the natural
or instinctual tendency for humans to engage in social communication and reconstruction in order to cooperatively cohabitate. As a subunit of the state, formal schooling
represents the broader culture from which it was conceived and for which it is utilized.
Schooling in modern society is to serve as a conduit for developing in children
“virtue” or the “means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming
through association with others in all the offices of life,” Dewey urged.66 It appears
that Dewey viewed formal schooling as the necessary institutional means for countering the otherwise negative impact of a cultural ethos that privileged individualistic
culture buttressed by both political and economic institutions. Dewey viewed these
institutions as antithetical to the development of human potential, which required
meaningful associational practices resulting from free and equal communication.
“All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral,”
Dewey concluded. “Learning” has “a social aim,” and when it effectively encompasses
Dewey’s idealized sociality, “the school becomes itself . . . a miniature community.”67
Dewey was one of the first modern theorists to methodically fuse education
and democracy into a sociopolitical philosophy. Educational philosophers since
Plato and Aristotle have promoted education as a public good (albeit for different
purposes), but today, we are witnessing a paradigmatic attack on the idea of the
public itself as it is consumed by market forces. I agree with Alison Kadlec when she
concludes that, “Dewey’s notion of experience is intersubjective, communicative,
and social,” as well as a living through of “the consequences of our actions,” which
“taken together . . . form the basis of a powerful resource for critical reflection and
social transformation.”68 Furthermore, Dewey offered a more radical democratic
communication theory than did Habermas because he sought to extend this normative process beyond political institutions to include “economic, international,
educational, scientific . . . artistic, [and] religious”69 institutions.
Habermas clearly perceived Dewey’s contribution to a pragmatic theory of
communication when he offered the following conclusion: “No one has worked
out [an institutionalization of the democratic procedure . . . by employing forms
of communication . . . that promise reasonable outcomes . . . more energetically
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than John Dewey.”70 Anticipating Habermas’s communicative action theory, Dewey
developed a deeply moral philosophy by ontologically locating social action and
change democratically through communication. This, in my opinion, is Dewey’s
most formidable accomplishment and one that can be seen throughout his works,
but, in particular, in Democracy and Education.
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